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CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 2, 2020) 
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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT
________________ 
 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.
 
The First Step Act empowers criminal defendants to 
request compassionate release for “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons.” 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).1 But 
 
1 The relevant portion of § 3582 provides: 
(c) MODIFICATION OF AN IMPOSED TERM OF 
IMPRISONMENT.–The court may not modify a 
term of imprisonment once it has been 
imposed except that— 
(1) in any case– 
(A) the court, upon motion of the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or 
upon motion of the defendant after the 
defendant has fully exhausted all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure 
of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a 
motion on the defendant’s behalf or the 
lapse of 30 days from the receipt of 
such a request by the warden of the 
defendant’s facility, whichever is 
earlier, may reduce the term of 
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before they make such requests, defendants must at least 
ask the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to do so on their behalf 
and give BOP thirty days to respond. See § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
And even then, defendants must first submit their motion 
to “the [sentencing] court”; we can only consider these 
motions on appeal. § 3582. 
Nevertheless, Francis Raia asks us to decide his 
compassionate-release motion in the first instance. 
Alternatively, he asks us to dismiss the government’s 
pending appeal so the District Court can decide the 
motion. But although he asked BOP to move for 
compassionate release on his behalf, he did not give it 
thirty days to respond. So we will deny Raia’s motion. 
I 
While running for local office in Hoboken, New Jersey, 
Raia directed campaign volunteers to bribe voters with 
$50 payments to vote for him by absentee ballot and 
support a measure he favored. A jury convicted Raia of 
 
imprisonment (and may impose a term 
of probation or supervised release with 
or without conditions that does not 
exceed the unserved portion of the 
original term of imprisonment), after 
considering the factors set forth in 
section 3553(a) to the extent that they 
are applicable, if it finds that— 
(i) extraordinary and compelling 
reasons warrant such a reduction 
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conspiring to use the mails to promote unlawful activity in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1952(b)(i)(2) (defining “unlawful activity” to include 
bribery). The District Court sentenced Raia to three 
months imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and 
a $50,000 fine. But the government thought the sentence 
was too lenient, having originally sought twenty-seven 
months imprisonment. It appealed to this Court under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(b). 
On March 3, 2020, with the government’s appeal 
pending, Raia reported to the federal correctional institute 
in Fairton, New Jersey to begin his sentence. Shortly 
thereafter, he asked BOP to move for compassionate 
release on his behalf. But before BOP responded, and 
before thirty days passed, Raia filed his own motion with 
the District Court for compassionate release given the 
present pandemic caused by COVID-19, a highly 
contagious respiratory virus which has already infected 
over 25,000 people in New Jersey and poses unique risks 
in population-dense prison facilities. See Federal Bureau 
of Prisons, COVID-19 Action Plan (Mar. 13, 2020, 3:09 
PM), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20200313_ 
covid-19.jsp; New Jersey, COVID-19 Information Hub, 
https://covid19.nj.gov/ (last updated Apr. 2, 2020, 1:00 
PM). In particular, Raia claimed he faces heightened risk 
of serious illness or death from the virus since he is sixty-
eight-years old and suffers from Parkinson’s Disease, 
diabetes, and heart issues. 
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Two days later, the District Court denied the motion, 
concluding that the pending appeal divested it of 
jurisdiction. In a footnote, however, the District Court 
offered that it would have granted the motion and released 
Raia to home confinement “[d]ue to the increased risk 
posed by a custodial term” in light of COVID-19, and 
because Raia’s offense “was non-violent and [Raia] has 
otherwise been a highly productive, charitable member of 
his community.” Order n.1, Mar. 26, 2020 (ECF No. 86). 
Raia has not appealed that order. Instead, he filed a 
motion asking this Court to decide his compassionate-
release motion. Alternatively, he asks us to return 
jurisdiction to the District Court by dismissing the 
government’s appeal without prejudice. He claims we 
have power to do so under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 3(a)(2), which notes: “An appellant’s failure to 
take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is 
ground only for the court of appeals to act as it considers 
appropriate, including dismissing the appeal.” 
II 
We cannot decide Raia’s compassionate-release 
motion in the first instance. Section 3582’s text requires 
those motions to be addressed to the sentencing court, a 
point several Circuits have noted and Raia himself 
acknowledges. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 948 
F.3d 733, 749 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Smith, 896 
F.3d 466, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Mot. 3. 
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Nor can we dismiss the government’s appeal under 
Rule 3(a)(2). Rule 3(a)(2) dismissal is a sanction for 
“fail[ing] to comply with procedural rules.” Horner Equip. 
Int’l, Inc. v. Seaside Pool Ctr., Inc., 884 F.2d 89, 93 (3d 
Cir. 1989); see also Lehman Bros. Holdings v. Gateway 
Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., L.P., 785 F.3d 96, 101 
(3d Cir. 2015). Here, there is nothing the government has 
failed to do. 
We could, however, remand the case to the District 
Court while retaining jurisdiction over the government’s 
appeal under Rule 12.1. That would allow the District 
Court to consider Raia’s compassionate-release request in 
the first instance.  
But any remand would be futile. As noted, Raia failed 
to comply with § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement: 
BOP has not had thirty days to consider Raia’s request to 
move for compassionate release on his behalf, and there 
has been no adverse decision by BOP for Raia to 
administratively exhaust within that time period (as such, 
we need not address administrative appeals here). 
Although the District Court’s indicative ruling did not 
mention the exhaustion requirement, it presents a glaring 
roadblock foreclosing compassionate release at this point. 
Accordingly, since Rule 3(a)(2) is inapt and since 
remanding the matter under Rule 12.1 would be futile, we 
will deny Raia’s motion outright. 
*      *      * 
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We do not mean to minimize the risks that COVID-19 
poses in the federal prison system, particularly for inmates 
like Raia. But the mere existence of COVID-19 in society 
and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison 
alone cannot independently justify compassionate release, 
especially considering BOP’s statutory role, and its 
extensive and professional efforts to curtail the virus’s 
spread. See generally Federal Bureau of Prisons, COVID-
19 Action Plan (Mar. 13, 2020, 3:09 PM), 
https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20200313_covid-
19.jsp. Given BOP’s shared desire for a safe and healthy 
prison environment, we conclude that strict compliance 
with § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement takes on 
added—and critical—importance. And given the Attorney 
General’s directive that BOP “prioritize the use of [its] 
various statutory authorities to grant home confinement 
for inmates seeking transfer in connection with the 
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic,” we anticipate that the 
statutory requirement will be speedily dispatched in cases 
like this one. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. to Dir., 
Bureau of Prisons 1 (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1262731/download. So we 
will deny Raia’s motion. 
